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Redefining the Contested
Case in the Missouri
Administrative Procedure Act:
A Call for Legislative Action
The opportunity for a hearing, the right to receive notice of the hearing
and the right to introduce evidence-litigants often presume they will receive
these fundamental rights in the United States court system. Parties to an
administrative hearing, however, are not always guaranteed these fundamental
rights during the administrative hearing process. The Missouri Administrative
Procedure Act (MAPA)' guarantees the basic due process rights of notice and
a hearing prior to and during an administrative hearing only to a party to a
contested case.' A party to a non-contested case is not guaranteed these
rights by the statute. Instead, the participants in a non-contested case have
two options for receiving due process: (1) proving that the proceeding invokes
the constitutional due process protections;3 or (2) requesting judicial review
of the agency decision.
Classifying an administrative proceeding as a contested case thus serves
two purposes: (1) assuring basic due process rights such as notice and
opportunity to have a hearing; and (2) defining the scope and standard of
judicial review of agency decisions. If a proceeding is a contested case, the
trial court must determine if the agency's findings are supported by "compe-
tent and substantial evidence."6 In contrast, in a non-contested case, the
judiciary is limited to deciding whether the agency's findings conform "to the
constitution, [and] the laws and is not 'otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or
1. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010-.215 (1986).
2. Id. §§ 536.063-.095.
3. Under this option the attorney would need to prove that the proceeding rose to
the level necessary to invoke the "flexible" due process guaranteed in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
4. The party receives due process under this option by virtue of de novo judicial
review of the agency decision. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for an
explanation of de novo review.
5. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100-.150 (1986).
6. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 18. The statutory guidelines for judicial review of
contested cases are set out at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.100-.140 (1986). See also Wood
v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W.2d 647 (1946) (en banc); Travers v.
Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys., 756 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988).
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capricious or involves an abuse of discretion. ' '7  To decide if the non-
contested case meets this standard, the judge conducts a de novo hearing.8
During this de novo hearing, the judge acts much like the administrative
tribunal in a contested case. The judge may "hear evidence on the merits of
the case, to find the facts, and to make a record."9
Thus, determining which administrative proceedings rise to the level of
a contested case becomes the threshold question. An attorney practicing
administrative law may find the statutory definition of a contested case very
ambiguous. The attorney may be frustrated furthei by the maze of legal
precedent which attempts to define "contested case." As a result, the attorney
often cannot readily determine if his client's proceeding is a contested case
and thus entitled to the elaborate and well-defined adjudicatory processes
guaranteed by MAPA.
A contested case is defined as "a proceeding before an agency in which
legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be
determined after hearing."1° This definition has generated an endless battle
between administrative agencies and parties subject to administrative control.
The courts, however, have been unable to settle the question of when a
hearing is "required by law." Courts have found hearings required by statutes
to be hearings "required by law."1" Courts have also found hearings required
by municipal ordinances to be hearings "required by law."' 2 The courts have
had more difficulty determining if a hearing required by a constitutional
provision such as due process or by an administrative regulation is a hearing
"required by law.,1 3
In 1989 alone, twenty-five Missouri decisions dealt with the contested
case issue."4 Despite extensive case law, courts have not consistently
7. Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(citations omitted). See also Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 18. Although the term "noncon-
tested case" has not been defined by the Missouri Legislature, the courts have
generally held that adjudicatory agency decisions made without a hearing are
noncontested cases. See State ex reL Wilson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Wilson, 332 S.W.2d
867, 870 (Mo. 1960); Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982). The statutory mechanism for obtaining judicial review of non-
contested cases is set out in Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.150 (1986).
8. Phipps, 645 S.W.2d at 94-95.
9. Id.
10. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(2) (1986).
11. Mills v. Federal Soldiers Home, 549 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
12. E & H Enters. v. Skaggs, 607 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
13. See A. NEELY & D. SHIN, ADMINSTRATIVE PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE § 8.10
(1986).
14. Reifschneider v. City of Des Peres, 776 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1989) (en bane);
Cuivre River Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 769 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1989);
[Vol. 55
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interpreted the definition. For example, in Franklin v. Board of Directors,
School District of Kansas City,'5 the court found that a hearing expressly
required by statute was a contested case.16 In contrast, in Benton-Hecht
Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Call,'7 the court found that a hearing expressly
required by another statute was not a contested case.'8 The same court
issued these opinions in the same year.
Thus, the practicing attorney finds precedent very confusing. The
attorney finds that the courts have proceeded on an ad hoc basis formulating
and changing rules and constructions of the definition of contested case as
varying fact patterns are presented. This Comment has two goals. First, the
Comment seeks to provide some practical guidelines for the attorney
confronted with a contested case issue. Second, the Comment seeks to
suggest a new definition of "contested case" which may alleviate the current
confusion.
Missouri enacted MAPA in 1945.19 This statute defined a contested
case as "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties, or
privileges of specific parties are required by statute to be determined after
hearing."2 The proposed Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("Model
Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Crist, 766 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); Hercules, Inc.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 787 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Benton-Hecht Moving
& Storage, Inc. v. Call, 782 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Walker v. Supervisor
of Liquor Control, 781 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Romans v. Director of
Revenue, 1989 WL 106634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Phil Crowley Steel Corp. v. Kine,
778 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); John W. Meara & Co. v. George, 774 S.W.2d
552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Franklin v. Board of Directors, School Dist. of Kansas City,
772 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Gray v. Jackson, 773 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989); Essex Contracting, Inc. v. City of DeSoto, 775 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); APC, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 770 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989);
Stelling v. Stelling, 769 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Lebedun v. Robinson 768
S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Thurwalker, 766 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); Carter v. Greene County, 765 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Missouri
Health Care Ass'n v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm'n, 777 S.W.2d 241
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Salameh v. County of Franklin, 767 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); Mickles v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund,
770 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Cox v. City of Columbia, 764 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989); State ex rel. Missouri Ozarks Economic Opportunity Corp. v. Long,
763 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
15. 772 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
16. Id. at 877.
17. 782 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
18. Id. at 671.
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APA"), developed by the Commission on Uniform State Laws in 1944,21
provided the basic framework for MAPA. The Commission drafted the Model
APA because of concerns that the states were commingling legislative and
judicial powers.22 The first administrative agencies had broad grants of
legislative powers subject to limited judicial review.23 Many of the agencies
performed both legislative and judicial functions.24 This commingling of
powers by one administrative body prompted the concern that a fourth branch
of government existed which was not subject to constitutional safeguards. 25
The Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged this concern by noting that even
a limited delegation of power "can result in the stifling of due process when
agencies are required to exercise rulemaking, enforcement and adjudicative
functions concurrently." 26
The MAPA drafters espoused similar goals.27 Specifically, MAPA
drafters sought to define types of administrative proceedings, and to provide
both procedural guidelines for proceedings and mechanisms to review
administrative rules and decisions.'
21. Pecora, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act: Planned Restraint
on the Consolidation of Power by Executive Branches of State Governments, 32 VILL.
L. REv. 451, 453 (1987).
22. Id. at 458. Most agencies are delegated broad quasi-legislative power to enact
rules and regulations. For example, the Missouri Division of Transportation (DOT)
enacts rules and regulations governing the operations of motor carriers. The agencies
are also delegated the quasi-judicial power to grant or revoke professional and business
licenses. The DOT is also granted the power to issue and revoke authority for motor
carriers to operate in the state.
23. Pecora, supra note 21, at 452.
24. Id. at 454.
25. Id. at 458. At its 1933 meeting a report by the Special Committee on
Administrative Law noted explained this concern as follows:
When the safeguard of isolation of the judicial function is dispensed with,
the practice of law degenerates all too often into a glorified form of
lobbying, all semblance of ethics disappear, cases are decided off the record
according to the wishes of politicians, and the profession, at times
deservedly, falls into disrepute.
Id. (citing 58 A.B.A. REP. OF THE FIFTY-SIXTH ANN. MEETING 318 (1933)). See also
Comment, Administrative Adjudications: An Overview of the Existing Models and
Their Failure to Achieve Uniformity and a Proposal for a Uniform Adjudicatory
Framework, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 (1985).
26. State Tax Comm'n v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n, 641 S.W.2d 69, 74
(Mo. 1982) (en banc).
27. Reed, The 1945 Missouri Constitution andAdministrativeAgency Legislation,
19 UMKC L. REv. 283, 287 (1951).
28. See State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Mo. 1958) (en
bane); 1945 Mo. LAws 1504; 1957 Mo. LAws 748.
(Vol. 55
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Soon after MAPA's enactment, its deficiencies became apparent. One of
the principal criticisms of MAPA was the definition of a contested case.29
Statutory language governing agency procedure was often ambiguous because
the legislature created agencies as the need for regulatory bodies arose.
Procedural statutes often failed to "indicate with any degree of certainty
whether particular agency determinations are, by the statute, required to be
made only after hearing."30 In an attempt to provide clearer, more compre-
hensive guidelines pertaining to the procedural mechanisms available in
contested cases, the Missouri Legislature substantially revised the MAPA in
1957.3' Under the original MAPA, a contested case was one in which a
hearing was required by statute. In 1957, the legislature redefined a
contested case to be one required by law.33 The legislature changed the
definition because the 1945 MAPA "was never intended to be a complete or
adequate statute on administrative review or procedure."3 The Commission
on Uniform State Laws revised the Model APA in 1961.3- As of 1989, the
District of Columbia and twenty-eight states, including Missouri, have enacted
administrative procedure acts based on the Model APA.35
29. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
30. Reed, supra note 27, at 288 (emphasis in original).
31. 1957 Mo. LAws 748. With the 1957 amendments, the Legislature redefined
a contested case to mean "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties
or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing."
Id. This definition continues to be used by the Legislature. See Mo. REv. STAT. §
536.010(2) (1986).
32. 1945 Mo. LAws 1504.
33. 1957 Mo. LAws 749.
34. Report of the Administrative Law Committee of the Missouri Bar, 4 J. Mo.
B. 161, 171 (1948).
35. Pecora, supra note 21, at 460.
36. See ALA. CODE §§ 41-22-1 to -27 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1001
to -1066 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-15-201 to -214 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-166 to -189 (1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1501 to -1511
(1981); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-13-1 to -21 (Harrison Supp. 1989); HAW. REv. STAT.
§§ 91-1 to -18 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5201 to -5218 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
127, paras. 1001-1021 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 17A.1-17A.23 (West
1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49.950-.970 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, §§ 8001-11008 (1989); MD. STATE Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -405 (1984);
MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 24.201-.315 (West 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-43-1
to -19 (Supp. 1989); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.010-.215 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
2-4-101 to -711 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-901 to -920 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 233B.010 to -.150 (1987); N.Y. A.P.A. LAw §§ 100-501 (McKinney 1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 301-322 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§
183.025-.725 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 42-35-1 to -18 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 1-26-1 to -41 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5-101 to -324 (1985 & Supp.
1990]
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By redefining a contested case as a hearing required by law rather than
by statute, the legislature broadened the scope of the definition. This
broadened definition, however, created the present ambiguity in the law. The
original definition created one possible category of contested cases: those
required by a statute. The 1957 definition, however, created the possibility, of
many categories of contested cases. For example, one could argue that "law"
includes statutes, municipal ordinances, administrative regulations and
constitutional provisions. Because these possibilities are not explicitly
addressed by the statute, individuals may argue that various administrative
proceedings qualify as contested cases.
A recent case which illustrates how the courts are continuing to wrestle
with the intricacies of the contested case definition is Benton-Hecht Moving
& Storage, Inc. v. Call.37 This case represents a good starting point for the
practitioner confronted with a contested case issue because it illustrates how
the courts have been unable to resolve satisfactorily the issue.
In Benton-Hecht the National Council on Compensation Insurance
("Council") filed an application with the Missouri Division of Insurance for
a rate increase for compensation insurance?3 The Council analyzes statistics
relating to workers' compensation for insurance companies. 9 The Division's
director, as required by statute,40 scheduled a public hearing to determine if
the proposed rate changes were "fair, reasonable and adequate."41 , Notice of
the hearing appeared in newspapers in St. Louis, Kansas City and Jefferson
City.
42
Hearing procedures adopted by the director allowed an opportunity for
anyone desiring to comment on the proposed rates to offer unsworn testimo-
ny.43 Only the Division's hearing officer and staff could interrogate
witnesses." Witnesses were not subject to cross-examination.45 Following
this hearing, Benton-Hecht's insurance increased 18.55%. 46
1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 801-849 (1985); W. VA. CODE 29A-1-1 to -7-4
(1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 227.01-.60 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. §§
16-3-101 to -115 (1977).
37. 782 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
38. Id. at 670.
39. Id.
40. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.320 (1986).
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Benton-Hecht petitioned the Cole County Circuit Court for judicial
review of the agency decision. Basing its decision solely on the evidence
received by the director at the hearing, the court affirmed the rate increase.47
Benton-Hecht then appealed the circuit court's decision to the Missouri Court
of Appeals. The issue on appeal was two-fold: 1) whether the agency
hearing was a contested case; and 2) whether the circuit court had employed
the proper standard of review.
The circuit court had reviewed the agency decision as if a contested case
hearing had been conducted. The director, however, had conducted the case
in the format of a non-contested case by refusing to accept sworn testimony
and by refusing to allow cross-examination of witnesses.41 The Benton-
Hecht court was, therefore, presented with a dilemma "because the director of
insurance conducted the public hearing as in a non-contested case, but the
circuit court did not take evidence and reach any independent determination
of the facts, a review procedure applicable only to a contested case. ' 49 If the
agency proceeding was a contested case, then the circuit court should have
remanded the case for a new agency hearing conducted in accordance with
contested case guidelines.50 If the agency proceeding was a non-contested
case, then the circuit court should have conducted a de novo hearing 1 as the
proper method of judicial review of the agency action. 2 The circuit court's
decision meant that the plaintiffs did not receive due process. They were
neither allowed to present evidence nor to cross-examine witnesses during the
agency proceeding. Then, during the judicial review, they were again denied
the opportunity to present their case.
The Benton-Hecht court noted that even though a case may present a
contest about rights, duties or privileges, the case may not meet the contested
case definition. 3 Instead, the element of adversity is essential to the
meaning of a contested case. 4 The hallmarks of a contested case are notice
to opposing parties, adversarial alignment and the right to introduce evi-
dence.5
47. kl
48. Id. at 671.
49. Id. at 669.
50. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 536.063-.095 (1986) for the procedures which must
be used in contested cases.
51. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text for an explanation of the de novo
hearing requirement.
52. Benton-Hecht, 782 S.W.2d at 671.
53. Id. at 670.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 671.
1990]
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Applying these rules, the court concluded that even though required by
statute, the proceeding at issue was not a contested case. The court reasoned
that since the hearing did not include any of the elements of a contested case,
the hearing was not a contested case5 6 The court noted the statute did not
expressly require notice to potential parties. 57 The court further noted that
the hearing was not adversarial.58 The court described the director's function
as "supervisory."59 The director is charged with determining whether the
workers' compensation rates are fair and reasonable. The court concluded that
the purpose of the hearing in the statute was "supervisory and not ad-
versarial."' 6
The Benton-Hecht holding is faulty for two reasons. First, the court used
hindsight to analyze the procedures employed by the agency. The court
examined what process and procedures the agency actually provided during
the hearing. This process is backwards. The court should have examined
what process and procedures were mandated by the statute which required the
hearing. In other words, the court should answer the question of whether the
agency provided the proper type of hearing rather than whether the procedures
employed by the agency constituted a contested or non-contested case.
Second, the court misinterpreted the legislative intent of the hearing
requirement in the statute. The primary function of administrative agencies
,is to provide expertise in specific areas of law. For example, the Division of
Insurance presumably has expertise in matters relating to insurance. The
hearing at issue here was designed to determine whether proposed rate
increases are fair and reasonable. The director of the Division of Insurance
is undoubtedly in the best position to make this determination. The Benton-
Hecht holding, however, ignores the value of agency expertise. By terming
the hearing a non-contested case, the court prevented the director from
applying his expertise. Instead, the judges of the Cole County Circuit Court
will have the burden of rate-making since non-contested cases receive de novo
review. One cannot reasonably believe that the legislature intended for
judges, rather than agency experts, to make specific determinations regarding
rates.
To understand how the courts have arrived at the confusion of Benton-
Hecht, one must understand the history of the contested case issue. Following
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construe the legislative definition of a contested case occurred in State ex rel.
Leggett v. Jensen."
In Jensen, plaintiffs John Barker and Floyd Jacobs provided legal services
to the Division of Insurance in litigation against an insurance company which
had overcharged its customers.62 Plaintiffs' normal fee contract dictated that
attorney's fees were paid out of any money recovered from the insurance
company. The insurance code, however, provided exclusive methods by
which attorneys could recover fees incurred during litigation against insurance
companies.63 Plaintiffs filed a claim with the Superintendent of the Division
of Insurance seeking an administrative declaration as to their right to recover
the fees owed them." The Superintendent denied plaintiffs' claim without
granting plaintiffs a hearing.65
Arguing that their claim was a contested case, plaintiffs r6quested judicial
review of the order in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. 6 The Superin-
tendent then instituted a proceeding in prohibition seeking to prevent the
Jackson County Circuit Court from exercising jurisdiction in the case.67
The court held a contested case "does not mean every case in which there
may be a contest about 'rights, duties or privileges' but instead one in which
the contest is required by law to be decided in a hearing before an administra-
61. 318 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1958) (en banc).
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id. The Insurance Code provided two methods by which plaintiffs should
seek to recover their fees. Under Mo. REV. STAT. § 374.220 (1949) "the expenses of
proceedings against insurance companies.., shall be assessed by the superintendent
upon the company proceeded against ... and shall be in the first instance paid by such
company, on the order of the superintendent directly to the person or persons rendering
the service." Mo. REv. STAT. § 374.260 (1949) (repealed 1981) provided that when
the expenses of the Division of Insurance exceed the fees collected, "the superintendent
shall, annually, assess upon all insurance companies doing business in this state a sum
equal to such excess."
64. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d at 355. The plaintiffs sought a declaration from the
Superintendent because the legislature empowered the Superintendent to assess
expenses of proceedings against an insurance company either against the particular
company which was the subject of a proceeding or pro rata against all insurance
companies doing business in the state. As the Jensen court noted, "[t]he intent of these
provisions, of course, is that all expense of the operation of the Division of Insurance
shall be paid by the companies so that it would cost the state nothing." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 354.
67. Id. If the proceeding was classified as a noncontested case, proper venue for
review of the case would be in Cole County pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.110
(1949). See also ex reL State Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830 (1958) (en banc).
1990]
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tive agency. ' 68  The court reached its decision after analyzing how the
contested case definition evolved in the Missouri legislature.69
The language of the original MAPA, however, greatly influenced the
court's decision.7" This influence is evidenced by the language of the court's
analysis. The court noted that the plaintiffs could "point to no law requiring
a hearing on their claim... such as is required to make it a contested
case... within the meaning of the Act."7" The court continued, noting
several statutory provisions of the Insurance Code which specifically required
a hearing. 72 The court further noted, "the Legislature did provide for
hearings where it deemed hearings should be required before action by the
Superintendent." 3 This language suggests that the court read the words
"required by law" to mean "required by statute."74  Because no statute
specifically requited that the Superintendent hold a hearing before issuing an
order, the court concluded that no hearing was required by law. Thus, the
decision of the Superintendent was not subject to review as a contested case,
and Jackson County did not have jurisdiction in the case.75
While Missouri appellate courts often cite Jensen when attempting to
define administrative proceedings, 76 the decision did not produce clear
guidelines for future decisions. The Jensen court based its decision on the
idea that no statute expressly granted the plaintiffs the right to a hearing.
Thus, the court established the rule that if a statute expressly requires a
hearing, then the hearing is a contested case. 77 The court, however, did not
68. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d at 356.
69. Id. at 356-57. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text for a discussion
of how the definition evolved in Missouri.




74. The court noted that some provisions of the Insurance Code codified at Mo.
REV. STAT. § 375 (1949 & Supp. 1957) specifically required administrative hearings.
"[T]he Legislature did provide for hearings where it deemed hearings should be
required .... ." Jensen, 318 S.W.2d at 358.
75. Id. at 360.
76. See, e.g., City of Richmond Heights v. Board of Equalization, 586 S.W.2d
338, 342 (Mo. 1979) (en banc); Randle v. Spradling, 556 S.W.2d. 10, 11 (Mo. 1977)
(en banc); Travers v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys., 756 S.W.2d
623, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91,
95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Dunning v. Board of Pharmacy, 630 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Hunter v. Madden, 565 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Moore
v. Damos, 489 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Kopper Kettle Restaurants, Inc.
v. City of St. Robert, 439 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
77. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d at 358.
[Vol. 55
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provide substantive guidelines on whether a hearing required by municipal
ordinance, administrative regulation or constitutional provision is "required by
law" within the meaning of the contested case definition.
Instead, the language of the Jensen opinion merely suggested that
administrative hearings other than those required by statute might be contested
cases. For example, in its discussion of the legislative history behind MAPA,
the Jensen court noted "a 'contested case' . . . is a case which must be
contested before an administrative agency because of a requirement (by
constitutional provision, statute, municipal charter provision or ordinance... )
for a hearing before it of which a record must be made unless waived.078
As stated above, however, the court limited its analysis of the Jensen facts to
the question of whether a statute required a hearing.79 The Jensen opinion
left unanswered the question of whether an agency regulation, municipal
ordinance or constitutional provision could create a contested case. Further-
more, the Jensen decision is not dispositive on the issue of whether a hearing
required by statute is a contested case. Instead, litigants and the courts have
turned to questions such as whether the statutorily-required hearing is
supervisory 0 or adversarial 81 Thus, the contested case question remains
a source of constant litigation in all types of administrative proceedings. This
is manifested by the sheer number of cases which address the contested case
issue each year.82
Missouri's courts have repeatedly held a hearing required by statute is a
hearing required by law, and therefore, is a contested case.83 Despite this
body of precedent, parties continue to bring this issue before the courts.
Franklin v. Board of Directors, School District of Kansas City,8 illustrates
how litigants can read ambiguity into the contested case definition even when
a statute mandates a hearing. The Board of Directors of the School District
78. Id. at 356.
79. Id. at 359.
80. St. Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 608 S.W.2d 413,414 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc).
81. Franklin v. Board of Directors, School Dist. of Kansas City, 772 S.W.2d 873,
877 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
82. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
83. See Randle v. Spradling, 556 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Wilson
v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. 1963); Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control,
334 S.W.2d 20, 25-26 (Mo. 1960); Gamble v. Hoffman, 695 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. City of Springfield v. Crouch, 687 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); Dunning v. Board of Pharmacy, 630 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982).
84. 772 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
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of Kansas City ("Board") demoted Melvin Franklin from principal to
teacher.85 After receiving notice of the demotion, Franklin requested a
hearing before the Board of Directors of the School District of Kansas City."
The Board sustained the demotion.Y Franklin then sought judicial review
of the Board's decision, questioning whether the proceeding was a contested
case.s8 This determination was crucial to what standard of review the trial
court should use.89
Relying on precedent such as the Jensen decision, the Franklin court
repeated that the hearing requirement is essential to the classification of any
proceeding.90 The court then noted that the hearing must be adversarial to
qualify as a contested case.9' The court found the hearing in question was
adversarial in nature because "[t]he purpose of such a hearing is to give the
certified employee an opportunity to offer evidence sustaining his de-
fense.., and an opportunity to persuade and convince the Board that it is
mistaken in its decision."' 2
Franklin argued that the hearing was not adversarial, but rather was post-
determinative in that it was conducted subsequent to the Board's decision to
demote him.93 The court rejected Franklin's argument because the statute
85. Id. at 875.
86. Id. The rights of a school principal in a nonmetropolitan school district are
governed by Mo. REV. STAT. § 168.101 (1986). Franklin, 772 S.W.2d at 876. This
statutory section grants any employee who has been with the school district for at least
five years the right to request a hearing regarding his demotion or lack of reemploy-
ment. Specifically, the statute provides:
The board shall grant such certificated employee a hearing if requested in
writing by him within ten days after the receipt of statement of reasons, the
hearing to be held within ten days after the request therefor, and to be open
at the request of the certificated employee. The certificated employee may
have counsel at the hearing; may testify and offer testimony of witnesses
as well as other evidence sustaining his defense and may cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 168.101(6) (1986).
87. Franklin, 772 S.W.2d at 875.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
standards of judicial review.
90. Franklin, 772 S.W.2d at 876.
91. Id. The concept of adversity as an essential element of a contested case was
established in St. Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 608 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Mo.
1980) (en banc).
92. Franklin, 772 S.W.2d at 877.
93. Id. at 876.
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required the Board to grant a hearing if the certificated employee properly
requested such a hearing.94
Thus, the Franklin court, like the Jensen court, construed the words
"required by law" to include a hearing required by a statute. Such a finding
is inherently consistent with the legislative creation of the laws of the state.
The finding is also supported by the original definition of the contested case
which focused on hearings required by statute.
The cases which have established that hearings required by statute are
contested cases provide some guidelines as to what elements make a hearing
required by law. As discussed in Franklin,95 the hearing requirement is the
key to any contested case classification. Of equal importance, however, is the
element of adversity.9 An attorney participating in an administrative
hearing, therefore, may rely on Jensen and Franklin for the proposition that
a hearing required by a statute may be required by law within the definition
of a contested case if the hearing is adversarial. Thus, an understanding of the
adversity concept is essential to any challenge of an agency action. Three
decisions effectively illustrate this concept.
In St. Louis County v. State Tax Commission,97 St. Louis County sought
review of an order of the State Tax Commission requiring the county to
implement a plan for equalization of real estate assessments. 98 The court had
to decide if the order was reviewable as the product of a contested case. 9
The court reiterated that a contested case is not necessarily every case in
which there may be a contest about rights, duties or privileges.1°° Instead,
the General Assembly'contemplated an adversarial hearing by using the term
contested case in section 536.100.01 Because the State Tax Commission
94. Id. at 877.
95. Id. at 876.
96. See Benton-Hecht Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Call, 782 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that the feature most indicative of a contested case is adversity-a
contest of opponents favoring divergent results).
97. 608 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
98. Id. at 414.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.100 (1986) provides:
Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies provided by law
and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether such
decision is affirmative or negative in form, shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof, as provided in sections 536.100 to 536.140, unless some
other provision for judicial review is provided by statute; provided,
however, that nothing in this chapter contained shall prevent any person
from attacking any void order of an agency at any time or in any manner
that would be proper in the absence of this section. Unreasonable delay on
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acts as a supervisory body over local assessing officials, there is no element
of adversity in the relationship."°
By statute, the State Tax Commission must review county reassessment
plans."°' After a statutorily required hearing,"° the Commission has sixty
days to approve or reject the county's plan. During the hearing, the
Commission hears evidence only from the county officials who submitted the
plan.' 0° The court ruled that the legislative intent of the hearing was to "aid
in the equalization of real property assessments.""°  The purpose of the
hearing was to "review equalization plans proposed by the counties and to
ensure that the general property tax laws are properly executed."107  The
court concluded that requiring a full-blown adversarial hearing would impede
the goal of equalization.'0 Accordingly, the order was not reviewable under
the contested case provisions.' 9
Smith v. Missouri State Board of Probation & Parole"° provides
another slant on the adversarial aspect of the contested case discussion. In
this case, Smith, an inmate of the Missouri Eastern Correctional facility, filed
for judicial review of his denial of probation.' The Board contended that
Smith had no statutory authority to seek judicial review.' Smith, however,
argued that MAPA allowed him to seek judicial review." 3
the part of any agency in deciding any contested case shall be grounds for
an order of the court either compelling action by the agency or removing
the case to the court for decision.
Id.
102. St. Louis County, 608 S.W.2d at 414.
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.750 (1979).
104. Id. § 137.750(6).





110. 743 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
111. Id. at 124.
112. Id. State regulations provide that an inmate may appeal an adverse parole
board decision if said appeal is made within thirty days on the proper form. Mo.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 80-2.010(9)(A) (1989). The record on appeal did not reveal
whether Smith had complied with this review procedure.
113. Smith relied on the following provision of the Missouri statutes:
Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies provided by law
and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case, whether such
decision is affirmative or negative in form, shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof, as provided in sections 536.100 to 536.140, unless some
other provision for judicial review is provied by statute ....
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The Smith court noted there was a statutory requirement that an inmate
receive a hearing regarding his application for parole."' The court
reasoned, however, that a hearing requirement does not automatically translate
into a contested case.1" Instead, the 'court must determine if the hearing is
of an adversarial nature.
1 1
6
The court concluded that after reviewing an inmate's records and
progress, the Board must evaluate the inmate as a person to determine his
suitability for parole. These duties suggested that the relationship between the
Board and the inmate was supervisory in nature. 1 7 The court based its
holding on the perceived legislative intent that the purpose of MAPA was not
"to confer jurisdicton to review Board decisions where the regulatory statute
itself precludes judicial review."" 8
In Welsch v. Department of Elementary & Secondary Education,"9 the
court directly confronted the issue of whether a hearing was adversarial. In
this case, Welsch requested approval for a sheltered workshop program. 20
The Department of Elementary and Secondary Education ("Department") held
a public hearing as required by Missouri statute' 21 to entertain public
statements of support or opposition."m Following the hearing, the Depart-
ment notified Welsch the proposed workshop did not meet statutory
guidelines."23 Welsch appealed the decision to the St. Louis County Circuit
Court, alleging that the Department's hearing amounted to a contested case.
124
The court first noted the hearing at issue was required by statute and,
therefore, met the initial hurdle of the contested case definition."' After
Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.100 (1986).
114. Smith, 743 S.W.2d at 124. This requirement may be found in Mo. REV.
STAT. § 217.690.2 (1986).
115. Smith, 743 S.W.2d at 124.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Id.
119. 731 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
120. Id. at 451. Welsh submitted an application for a hearing before the
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. §
178.920.1 (1978).
121. Mo. REV. STAT. § 178.920.2 (1978).
122. Welsch, 731 S.W.2d at 451.
123. Id. at 451-52.
124. Id. at 452. If the proceeding was a contested case, proper venue would be
in St. Louis County per Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.110 (1978). In contrast, if the
proceeding was not a contested case, then proper venue would only lie in Cole County
under the rationale of State ex reL State Tax Comm'n v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830 (Mo.
1958) (en banc). Welsch, 731 S.W.2d at 452.
125. Welsch, 731 S.W.2d at 452.
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analyzing the procedures prior to and during the hearing, the court concluded
the hearing was not adversarial. Thus, it could not be a contested case.
126
This method of analysis represents the same type of backward analysis which
the court used in Benton-Hecht. Rather than looking at what type of
procedures should have been used by the agency, the court looked at what
procedures the agency actually employed.
While the Welsch analysis is faulty, the court did provide specific
guidance on what elements constitute an adversarial proceeding: (1) an
agency-instituted proceeding leading to a proposed agency action; (2) parties
entitled to notice; (3) sworn testimony by parties testifying at the proceeding;
(4) a right to direct or cross examination of witnesses; and (5) evidentiary
rules.27 The first element outlined by the Welsch court is questionable
since some agency proceedings may be instituted by private individuals rather
than by the agency.
The courts have placed emphasis on the element of adversity because due
process concerns are an inherent component of an adversarial relationship.
When an agency brings or entertains an action against a citizen, the agency
is in a superior position to the citizen because of the agency's expertise. The
agency specializes in formulating and applying specific areas of law. When
the agency brings an action against a private citizen, the parties are usually
working towards opposite goals. Thus, these adversarial proceedings create
the concern that the private citizen receive fundamental due process rights
from the beginning of the proceeding. To address this concern, the contested
case definition guarantees minimum due process rights. The elements of due
process necessary in an adversarial proceeding are: (1) an impartial tribunal;
(2) notice and opportunity to be heard; (3) hearing procedures analogous to
those provided at a trial; and (4) a hearing transcript or administrative record
which will allow adequate judicial review.12 Furthermore, the decision of
the administrative tribunal should be subject to specific judicial review to
ensure that the tribunal has not exceeded its power or acted in a prejudicial
manner.
Based on the cases analyzed thus far, one can conclude that if a statute
requires an adversarial hearing, then the proceeding will be a contested case.
Unfortunately, the administrative lawyer often confronts proceedings in which
a hearing is not expressly required by a statute.
Instead, the hearing may be mandated by a municipal ordinance, agency
regulation or due process concerns. Thus, the question inherent in all
administrative proceedings is whether a hearing may be required by law if it
126. Id. at 453.
127. Id.
128. Blackford, Moody & Kochery, A Survey of Missouri Administrative
Agencies, 19 UMKC L. Rayv. 233, 237 (1951).
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is not expressly required by a state statute. The Jensen decision set forth the
notion that a hearing required by statute is a hearing required by law. The
next logical question to come before the courts is whether a hearing required
by municipal ordinance is required by law. The dicta in Jensen suggested that
this question would be answered yes.
Indeed, the very definition of "agency"" 9 suggests that a municipality
is within the ambit of MAPA.130 This argument is further supported by the
fact that the Missouri legislature created a new definition and classification of
agency in 1976."3 One of the potential problems with applying MAPA to
municipalities was whether local governments would be bound by the
rulemaking provisions in MAPA.132 Rather than enacting a provision to
specifically exempt municipalities from MAPA, the legislature chose to create
a new classication of a "state agency.' 133  Only those entities defined as
state agencies are bound by MAPA's rulemaking requirements. 34 There-
fore, the legislature left open the possibility that MAPA could bind municipal-
ities.
Missouri appellate courts have classified hearings conducted pursuant to
municipal ordinances or regulations in a number of cases. 3 Perhaps the
best known of these cases is Kopper Kettle Restaurants, Inc. v. City of St.
129. MAPA defines "agency" as "any administrative officer or body existing
under the constitution or by law and authorized by law or the constitution to make
rules or to adjudicate contested cases." Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(1) (1986).
130. Davis, The Missouri Administrative Procedure Act and the Cities, 35 J. Mo.
B. 433, 435 (1979).
131. 1976 Mo. LAWS 769.
132. Davis, supra note 130, at 435.
133. A state agency is defined as:
[E]ach board, commission, department, officer or other administrative office
or unit of the state other than the general assembly, the courts, the
governor, or a political subdivision of the state, existing under the
constitution or statute, and authorized by the constitution or statute to make
rules or to adjudicate contested cases.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(5) (1986).
134. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021-.025 (1986) governs the rulemaking procedures
to be employed by state agencies. Since a state agency does not include political
subdivisions of the state, a municipality is not bound by MAPA's rulemaking
requirements.
135. State ex rel. City of Springfield v. Crouch, 687 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); Feltz v. Hesselback, 675 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); E & H Enters., Inc.
v. Skaggs, 607 S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Hunter v. Madden, 565 S.W.2d 456
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State ex rel. Steak n Shake, Inc. v. City of Richmond Heights,
560 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
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Robert.'36  Pursuant to municipal ordinance, 137 Kopper Kettle applied to
the Board of Aldermen of St. Robert for a license to sell liquor by the
drink.138  The Board denied the application.139  Kopper Kettle then
appeared before the Board and requested that the board reconsider the
application. The Board tabled Kopper Kettle's request for reconsidera-
tion.140
Kopper Kettle filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's
action.' The court acknowledged "[tihe dispositive question before us is
whether or not the proceeding before the board of aldermen was a 'contested
case' as that term is used in our Administrative Procedure Act.0
42
In analyzing the question, the court explained the statutory definition of
a contested case as "a case which must be contested because of some
requirement by statute, municipal charter, ordinance or constitutional provision
for a hearing of which a record must be made unless waived." 143 Kopper
Kettle argued the "showing" required by the ordinance amounted to a
contested case. 44
The court rejected Kopper Kettle's argument for two reasons. First, the
ordinance regulating city liquor licenses did not expressly require notice and
a hearing on the application.1 45 The court was unwilling to imply a hearing
requirement because "an applicant may make a 'showing' sufficient to warrant
the issuance of a license or a permit without appearing and giving evi-
dence."'46 For these reasons, the court held "absent a statutory requirement,
notice and a hearing are not prerequisites to the exercise of discretionary
authority to grant or deny a liquor license." 1 47 In other words, the Board's
consideration of Kopper Kettle's application was not a contested case.
The Kopper Kettle decision, however, did not definitively establish that
hearings held pursuant to municipal ordinance are never contested cases.
Since the court found that the municipal ordinance did not require a hearing,
136. 439 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
137. The ordinance in question provided that any license applicant "show to the
satisfaction of the City Board" that certain requirements relating to available facilities
and location of the business had been met by the applicant. Id. at 3.




142. Id. at 3.




147. Id. at 4.
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the court left unanswered the question of whether a hearing expressly required
by a municipal ordinance is a contested case.
Following the Kopper Kettle decision, the courts have held that a hearing
expressly required by municipal ordinance is indeed a contested case. " '
One such decision is Vorbeck v. McNeal.49 Vorbeck was a sergeant in the
St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. During a meeting of the Board of
Police Commissioners, Vorbeck made some disparaging remarks about the
Board's president, McNeal.150 At the next Board meeting, the Board
publicly censured Vorbeck.' Vorbeck then filed for judicial review
alleging the public censure amounted to disciplinary action. This disciplinary
action occurred without the notice and hearing required by the Board's
regulations. 2
The court acknowledged that a municipal ordiance or regulation which
required a hearing could amount to a contested case. 53 - The court ruled that
the facts surrounding Vorbeck's censure had not generated a contested case
hearing.'54 The court reasoned that Vorbeck was not actually disciplined
because the Board took no action to deprive him of any of the privileges of
his office or employment. Therefore, "no rights required by law to be
determined after a hearing" were at issue.' 55 Vorbeck, therefore, suggests
that a hearing required by municipal ordinance may be a contested case if the
element of adversity is present.
Another case addressing a hearing required by municipal ordinance is
Housing Authority of St. Louis County v. Lovejoy. 5 6 This case represents
thoughtful analysis by a court in determining whether a hearing rose to the
level of a contested case. In Lovejoy, Maurice Lovejoy was a tenant of a
public housing program in St. Louis. In 1985 the Housing Authority notified
Lovejoy his lease would not be renewed. 7 At a hearing before the
148. Medvick v. Ollendorf, 727 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State ex
rel. City of Springfield v. Crouch, 687 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Feltz v.
Hesselback, 675 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); E & H Enters., Inc. v. Skaggs, 607
S.W.2d 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Vorbeck v. McNeal, 560 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. Ct. App.
1977).
149. 560 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
150. Id. at 248.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 249.
153. Id. at 250.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 762 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
157. Id. at 844.
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Housing Authority, a hearing panel decided that the non-renewal was
proper.158 The Housing Authority then proceeded with an unlawful detainer
action against Lovejoy.'5 9 The circuit court eventually granted the Housing
Authority's motion for summary judgment. The court held Lovejoy was
collaterally estopped from raising issues which had been determined by the
hearing panel. The circuit court believed the Housing Authority hearing was
a contested case. Accordingly, Lovejoy had thirty days in which to seek
judicial review of the hearing panel's decision.' 60 Since Lovejoy did not
appeal the panel's decision, he waived his right to raise any issues addressed
at the hearing. Lovejoy appealed the circuit court's decision.161
On appeal, the reviewing court held the Housing Authority hearing was
not a contested case. 162 The court began its analysis by looking at the
procedures the Housing Authority employed during the hearing. The court
noted that "the hearing received did not conform to the procedures of a
contested case." The court wrote that "[tihe inability of [Lovejoy] to put on
or rebut evidence as well as the absence of sworn testimony demonstrated the
hearing was not conducted with the adversarial nature necessary for a
'hearing' under the MAPA."' 63 This initial analysis is reminiscent of that
used by the court in both Benton-Hecht and Welsch. The court evaluated the
procedures employed by the agency and then determined whether the
procedures rose to the level of a contested case. The Housing Authority court,
however, did not commit the error of Benton-Hecht and Welsch. Rathei than
stopping the analysis at what procedures had been employed by the agency,
the court delved into the statutuory intent behind the hearing. Thus, the court
was concerned with whether the agency had employed the procedures required
by the statute.
The procedures for the Housing Authority hearing provided that "[a]
decision by... [the] hearing panel... in favor of [the Housing Authority]
or which denies the relief requested by the complainant ... shall
not... affect... any rights the complainant may have to a trial de novo or
judicial review."'' " Based on this language, the court determined that the
hearing was not intended to determine Lovejoy's rights and therefore, was not
a contested case. The court's decision is supported by the fact that judicial





162. Id. at 846.
163. Id. at 845.
164. Id.
165. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.150 (1986). See Phipps v. School Dist. of Kansas
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Missouri is fairly unique in extending the provisions of its Administrative
Procedure Act, including the contested case definition, to municipalities.166
Most jurisdictions have exempted municipalities and local governmental
bodies from Administrative Procedure Act provisions because the municipal
officers are responsible to an electorate.167
Whether a hearing required or suggested by agency regulation creates a
contested case has been a far more troubling question for the courts. In at
least one case, Phipps v. School District of Kansas City,'ss the Western
District Court of Appeals of Missouri was willing to "assume ... without
deciding, that a requirement for hearing by a regulation suffices to meet the
definition 'required by law. '" 69 The court was willing to make this assump-
tion because the contested case issue did not turn on the assumption. Instead,
the hearing requirement at issue was set out in a school district policy book.
The court held the policy was analogous to a municipal ordinance, not an
administrative regulation. 7 °
More often, the contested case issue arises when an agency head is
granted the discretion to hold a hearing, before rendering a decision. Many
legislative delegations of authority to agencies grant the agency broad powers.
The agency may then enact regulations outlining specific procedures to be
utilized in various types of decisions such as ratemaking cases or penalty
cases. Alternatively, the agency may authorize the agency head to decide on
a case-by-case basis. For example, prior to making a ruling on a particular
issue, the agency head could elect to receive written comments or to take oral
testimony at a public hearing. When the agency head decides to hold a public
hearing, the issue often arises as to whether the hearing is a contested case.
The 1989 en banc decision in Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Crist,171
effectively illustrates how the courts have analyzed these discretionary
administrative regulations.
The Missouri Division of Insurance ("Division") investigated Golden Rule
in 1984. The investigation culminated in the preparation of a Market Conduct
City, 645 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
166. Davis, supra note 130, at 434.
167. Id. at 434-35.
168. 588 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
169. Id. at 133. The court was probably willing to make this assumption because
it could ultimately find that even if a hearing required by agency regulation was
required by law, the hearing in question was not required by an agency regulation.
Instead, the hearing was required by an agreement between the school district and its
union employees.
170. Id.
171. 766 S.W.2d 637 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
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Report ("Report") prepared by the Division staff.'7 Based on information
in the Report, the Division ordered Golden Rule to show cause why it should
not be disciplined.' 73  Eventually, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the Division admitted that
certain allegations in the Report were meritless.174 The Division further
agreed to delete certain portions of the Report.175
During the settlement negotiations, the parties were not able to agree
whether, following the corrections and deletions, the Report should be filed
as a public document or kept confidential. 176 The Division granted Golden
Rule a hearing to resolve this issue. 77
During the hearing, Division director Lewis Crist, heard testimony from
witnesses for both Golden Rule and the Division. Noting the presumption in
favor of making documents public, the director ordered the Report filed as a
public document.178 Golden Rule appealed, arguing for review of the
director's decision as a contested case.179
Relying on its earlier decision, 8 ' the court held "[t]he Director's
decision to hear evidence to aid him in the exercise of his discretion does not
raise the level of the proceeding to a 'contested case."'' Thus, the Golden
Rule decision suggests that when an agency exercises its discretionary powers
to hold a hearing, the proceeding will not be a contested case. This rule is





176. Id. at 638.
177. Id. The Division's director is expressly granted authority to decide whether
to make reports public records as follows:
The office shall be a public office and the records shall be public records
and shall at all times be open to the inspection of the public subject to such
rules as the director shall make for their safekeeping; provided, however,
that the work proudct of the director, his employees and agents, including
but not limited to work papers of examinations of companies, work papers
of investigations of companies, agents, brokers and insurance agencies and
confidential communications to the division of insurance, shall not be
considered public records except as the director may decide otherwise, or
until the matter to which the work papers are related becomes final.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 374.070.1 (1986).
178. Golden Rule, 766 S.W.2d at 638.
179. Id.
180. Jackson County Pub. Water Supply Dist. v. State Highway Comm'ii, 365
S.W.2d 553, 559 (Mo. 1963).
181. Golden Rule, 766 S.W.2d at 638.
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hearing required by law. 82 A discretionary hearing is obviously not
required by law. Therefore, the practicing attorney may rely on Golden Rule
for the proposition that a discretionary agency hearing is not a contested case.
These cases have not held that a hearing required by adminstrative
regulation may be a contested case. At this point, the courts have not
expressly answered this question. Therefore, the practicing attorney is left to
wonder whether a hearing required by administrative regulation is a contested
case. The attorney can find some guidance on this issue by applying similar
Missouri cases and federal case law.
First, the Missouri courts have expressly held "[r]egulaiions and rules
promulgated by government agencies pursuant to delegation of authority from
Congress have the force and effect of law."'83
Secondly, the Missouri courts have frequently analogized administrative
regulations to Missouri statutes. For instance, Missouri's Western District
Court of Appeals has compared an administrative regulation governing notice
procedures to state statutes regarding notice. T8 The court has also adopted
a standard of rational basis review for constitutional challenges to administra-
tive regulations which is analogous to the review of Missouri statutes. 85
Finally, the courts have directly analogized administrative rules to procedural
statutes.
86
This variety of case law strongly suggests that the courts would find that
an admistrative regulation is analogous to a statute for contested case
purposes. The administrative regulation could, therefore, give rise to a
contested case.
Whether a hearing mandated or suggested by a constitutional provision
such as due process creates a hearing required by law within the meaning of
a contested case often presents the most difficulty for the court. In answering
this question, the court must consider the due process requirements of both the
federal and Missouri constitutions.' 87
182. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(2) (1986) (emphasis added).
183. Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883, 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
see also Insurance Co. v. West Plains Air, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982).
184. Hedges v. Department of Social Services, 585 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
185. State ex rel. Kirkpatrick v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 686 S.W.2d 888,
895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
186. St. Louis Police Officers' Ass'n v. Sayad, 685 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984). See also State v. Kummer, 741 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
187. The Missouri constitution provides "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." Mo. CONST. art. I, § 10. The federal
constitution provides no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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The Missouri Supreme Court has noted that due process provisions are
"for the protection of life, liberty, and property as against State governmental
action through ... administrative authority."" The basic elements of
procedural due process at issue are: (1) opportunity to be heard; (2) an
impartial decision-maker; (3) notice; (4) opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; and (5) the opportunity to present evidence. 9
Walker v. Personnel Advisory Board'90 illustrates how the court may
read the federal constitution to require a contested case hearing. Due to
funding problems, Missouri's Personnel Advisory Board laid off two
employees of Farmington State Hospital.19' The employees, Walker and
Mobrice, argued that they were laid off because of animosity between
themselves and the superintendent of Farmington State Hospital.192
The court began its analysis by noting "no statute, municipal charter or
ordinance require[d] a pre-termination hearing for an employee who is to be
laid off."'93 The statute governing layoffs granted hospital superintendents
the discretion to lay off public employees during fiscal crises. 4 The court
concluded "this was not a contested case under the statute unless due process
rights mandate[d] a hearing."
The court reasoned that due process considerations arise only when a
deprivation of interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection
of property and liberty is at issue.1 9 A property interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment is "an individual entitlement grounded in state law
which cannot be removed except 'for cause. '""96
Applying this property interest standard, the court concluded that the
employees did not have an entitlement to continued employment. The court
based its decision on the fact that the statute 97 provided for administrative
188. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, 263 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Mo. 1954).
189. Mueller v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 466, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
190. 670 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
191. Id. at 2. In 1981 the Missouri Department of Mental Health ordered the
layoff of 900 employees. Farmington State Hospital is one of several facilities under
the control of the Department. One hundred and thirty-nine employees at Farmington
were laid off. Only Walker and Mobrice appealed their layoffs.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 36.360 (1978).
195. Walker, 670 S.W.2d at 3 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
569-70 (1972)).
196. Id. (quoting Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982)).
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 36.360 (1978).
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discretion in determining whether employees should be laid off during
financial difficulties. 9 '
The court continued its analysis by considering whether the layoff
without hearing had violated any liberty interest. The court relied on the
United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents v. Roth'99 for the
elements of a fourteenth amendment liberty interest violation. Roth estab-
lished that state conduct amounts to a liberty interest violation when the
conduct "might seriously damage [the employee's] standing and associations
in his community."' Of primary concern is whether the state conduct
imposes "a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] [the employee's]
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities."
20 1
Applying these standards, the court found that the employees' liberty
interest had not been violated.202 The letters informing Walker and Mobrice
of their layoffs contained no reference to unsatisfactory performance or
conduct by the employees.203
Another case which analyzes the fourteenth amendment due process
concerns is State v. Brackman.2°4 James Anding was an inmate in the
Missouri Eastern Correctional Center in Franklin County. The Division of
Adult Institutions decided to transfer Anding to the Missouri Training Center
for Men in Randolph County. Anding sought judicial review of the transfer.
At issue was whether the Division's decision to transfer Anding amounted to
a contested case.205
After establishing that no statute or agency regulation required a
contested case hearing, the court considered whether a constitutional provision
mandated a hearing.' The court held "an inmate enjoys no constitutional
right to remain in a particular institution and generally is not entitled to due
process protections prior to an administrative transfer."207
These cases suggest that the courts will consider whether the parties have
a "right" which is at issue in the hearing. If a "right" is at issue, then the
courts will rule that due process requires a full-blown, adversarial hearing.
198. Walker, 670 S.W.2d at 3.
199. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
200. Id. at 573.
201. Id.
202. Walker, 670 S.W.2d at 4.
203. Id.
204. 737 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
205. Id. at 518.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 519 (citing Meachum v. Feno, 427 U.S. 215, 225-28 (1976)).
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Accordingly, the proceeding will probably be classified as a contested
case.
208
One exception to this general rule has evolved. When a property right
is at issue, the court may rule that the contested case hearing or judicial
review of the hearing may be postponed.209 Thus, the court may find that
a state may act first and then grant either administrative or judicial review of
the action. This state conduct will generally be condoned when the purpose
or goal of the state action would be seriously undermined if the action was
delayed by a hearing.10
The goal of this Comment was to provide some practical guidelines for
the attorney confronted with a contested case before an administrative agency.
Because the courts have not interpreted "contested case" consistently,21 howev-
er, formulating general rules is very difficult. Furthermore, following the Benton-
Hecht decision,212 the courts seem unwilling to give weight to the legislative
intent behind a hearing requirement. Even worse, the courts tend to evaluate
what procedures the agency has employed in a particular hearing rather than
what procedures should have been employed. This method of analysis lets the
agency decide whether a hearing will be treated as a contested or non-
contested case on an ad hoc basis.
At best, a practicing attorney can rely on the fact that a hearing required
by a statute or municipal ordinance will be a contested case if the parties are
in an adversarial posture. Furthermore, due process concerns may also prompt
a contested case hearing.
These guidelines are not very helpful to one confronted with an
administrative agency proceeding. Considering the confusion and lack of
uniform decisions in this area of law, two alternatives are particularly
appealing. First, the Missouri Supreme Court could accept the transfer of a
case and then set out some definitive guidelines for contested cases.
Alternatively, the Missouri Legislature could amend the MAPA to include a
more comprehensive definition of a contested case. This alternative is
208. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court decision
of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
In Wong Yang Sung, the Court noted that the federal APA established formal hearing
requirements only for adjudications "required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. at 48. The Court held, however, that the
constitutional requirement of procedural due process mandated a formal adjudication
in certain cases, even if no statute required such an adjudication. Id. at 51-53.
209. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
210. Walker, 670 S.W.2d at 4 (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589
(1931)).
211. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 37-60 and accompanying text.
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preferable because the legislature could enact a comprehensive, less ambigu-
ous definition of a contested case which could ease the burden on the courts.
The legislature should focus on the following considerations in enacting a
new definition.
First, attention should be directed to the "required by law" phrase in the
current contested case definition. In enacting this general language, the
legislature probably hoped to guarantee contested case due process protection
to administrative proceedings other than those expressly required by statute.
Such a goal is admirable. The goal, however, has not been realized. While
the courts have granted contested case status to a variety of administrative
proceedings, the actual result of this definition has been continual litigation
over what types of law can generate a contested case hearing. The cases
decided between MAPA amendment to the contested case definition and today
show that hearings required by statute,213 municipal ordinance,21 ' and
constitutional provisions 1 5 can be contested cases. Since these are clearly
sources of law in Missouri, the legislature could amend the definition to
specifically include the language that a "hearing required by statute, municipal
ordinance, or constitutional provision" is a contested case, provided other
criteria are met.
The legislature would also have to decide whether hearings required by
administrative regulation should be contested cases. Since case law suggests
that administrative regulations are a source of law, the legislature should
include "administrative rule or regulation" in the new definition.
One factor which the legislature needs to address is the adversity element
which the courts have emphasized.1 6 Initially, the courts used the adversity
element to distinguish between cases required by law which were not intended
to be contested cases. For example, the State Tax Commission was not
intended to have an adversarial relationship with municipal taxing authorities.
Instead, the intent in establishing the Commission was to create a supervisory
body that could monitor the municipal taxing authorities.1 7 In contrast, the
court found that the director of the Division of Insurance is in a supervisory
position over employers who must pay workers' compensation insurance.18
213. Franklin v. Board of Directors, School Dist. of Kansas City, 772 S.W.2d 873
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
214. Vorbeck v. McNeal, 560 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
215. Walker v. Personnel Advisory Bd., 670 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. -App. 1984).
216. St. Louis County v. State Tax Comm'n, 608 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Mo. 1980)
(en banc); Franklin, 773 S.W.2d at 877; Smith v. Missouri State Bd. of Probation &
Parole, 743 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
217. St. Louis County, 608 S.W.2d at 414.
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This finding seems to stretch the supervisory concept to its limit since the
director is making findings which require employers to pay increased rates.
Such a relationship seems adversarial rather than supervisory.
To prevent inaccurate characterizations by the courts in the future, the
legislature needs to state explicitly whether adversity is a key factor in
defining contested cases. The adversity element is useful since proceedings
which were clearly not intended to be contested cases, such as those between
local taxing authorities and the State Tax Commission, do not receive
contested case benefits and protections. If the legislature agrees with this
reasoning, then the legislature should explain what types of relationships are
adversarial. The Welsch opinion could prove particularly helpful here. The
Welsch 'court outlined the elements which create an adversarial relation-
ship.219 By modifying the first element and adopting the other four, the
legislature could arrive at a solid definition of adversarial proceedings. The
elements to be included in the definition should be: (1) an administrative
proceeding leading to a proposed agency action; (2) parties entitled to notice;
(3) sworn testimony by parties testifying at the proceeding; (4) a right to direct
or cross examination of witnesses; and (5) evidentiary rules.
Furthermore, the legislature should caution the courts to consider what
types of procedures should have been employed in a hearing. Currently, the
courts often look merely at what types of procedures were employed.220
This process means that the agency, not the legislature, often determines
whether a 6ase is a contested or non-contested proceeding. When the
legislature has provided guidance on this issue, ignoring the guidance means
that the agency is exercising more power than it really has.
Finally, the courts often seem unwilling to look at legislative intent
behind a hearing requirement. 221 In their haste to classify hearings as non-
contested cases, the court often fails to consider whether the administrative
expertise available in a contested case should be of the utmost concern. The
legislature should give the court clear guidance on what type of proceeding
is desired when a hearing is required by statute. 2
219. See supra text accompanying note 127.
220. See text and analysis following note 60.
221. See text and analysis following note 60.
222. The legislature should amend Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(1) to read:
"Adversarial proceeding" means any proceeding before an administrative
tribunal in which
(a) parties are entitled to notice;
(b) parties may present sworn testimony at the proceeding;
(c) parties have the right to direct and/or cross examination of witnesses;
and,
(d) parties must follow evidentiary rules promulgated by the agency.
The legislature should amend Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.010(3) to read:
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The contested case definition is a central part of the MAPA. Since the
courts have been unwilling to apply a consistent meaning to the definition, the
legislature should amend the definition. Otherwise, more decisions like
Benton-Hecht will occur-decisions in which the parties do not receive their
basic due process rights and in which administrative expertise is disregarded.
SARAH J. MAXWELL
"Contested case" means an adversarial proceeding before an agency in which
legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by statute,
municipal ordinance, constitutional provision, or administrative rule or regulation
to be determined after hearing.
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